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The growth of India’s manufacturing sector since 
1991 has been attributed mostly to trade liberalization 
and more permissive industrial licensing. This paper 
demonstrates the significant impact of a neglected factor: 
India’s policy reforms in services. The authors examine 
the link between those reforms and the productivity of 
manufacturing firms using panel data for about 4,000 
Indian firms from1993 to 2005. They find that banking, 
telecommunications, insurance and transport reforms 
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all had significant, positive effects on the productivity 
of manufacturing firms. Services reforms benefited both 
foreign and locally-owned manufacturing firms, but the 
effects on foreign firms tended to be stronger. A one-
standard-deviation increase in the aggregate index of 
services liberalization resulted in a productivity increase 
of 11.7 percent for domestic firms and 13.2 percent for 
foreign enterprises.  
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I.   Introduction 
 
A  vital  element  of  India‟s  rapid  economic  growth  since  the  early  1990s  has  been  the  improved 
performance of its manufacturing sector. Output in manufacturing grew by 5.7 percent per year in the 
period 1993-2005 (Reserve Bank of India, 2008). Previous explanations for the revival of manufacturing 
emphasize trade liberalization, more permissive industrial licensing policies, and the limited labor market 
reforms undertaken since 1991 (see review below). In focusing primarily on proximate policies, however, 
previous analyses have ignored what we demonstrate is a critical factor, policy reforms in services sectors.  
 
The neglect of services is surprising, first of all, because service inputs, notably finance, transport and 
telecommunications,  are  an  important  component  of  inputs  to  manufacturing,  so  the  potential  for 
downstream  effects  is  large.
1 Moreover, reforms in th e 1990s, allowing greater foreign and domestic 
competition with  greatly improved regulation, have visibly transformed these services sectors .
2 Indian 
firms are no longer at the mercy of inefficient public monopolies, but can now source from a wide range of 
domestic and foreign private sector providers operating  in  an increasingly competitive environment.  
Available  evidence suggests that firms  today  have access to better, newer and more diverse business 
services.  
 
In this paper,  we  address  three questions:  Has services reform led to an increase in manufacturing 
productivity?  Have  reforms  in  some  services  had  a  bigger  impact  than  in  others?  Have  some 
manufacturers (e.g. foreign firms based in India) benefitted more than others ? These questions matter 
profoundly for policy; not only is services reform in India incomplete , but across the world some of the 
                                                 
1 These inputs affect inter alia a firm‟s ability to invest in new business opportunities and better production technology, to 
exploit economies of scale by concentrating production in fewer locations, to efficiently manage inventories, and to make 
coordinated  decisions  with  their  suppliers  and  consumers.  Ethier  (1982)  provides  theoretical  support  for  this  argument, 
showing that access to a greater variety of inputs results in higher productivity among downstream industries. Markusen (1989) 
argues that many producer services are both differentiated and knowledge-intensive. Knowledge intensity in turn suggests 
strong  scale  economies  in  that  knowledge  must  be  acquired  at  an  initial  learning  cost,  after  which  the  knowledge-based 
services can be provided at a very low marginal cost. His theoretical results suggest the possibility of significant gains from 
liberalized trade in producer services. The importance of intermediate inputs for productivity growth has also been emphasized 
in  theoretical  contributions  of  Grossman  and  Helpman  (1991).  A  recent  theoretical  contribution  by  Jones  (2010)  draws 
attention to how linkages between firms through intermediate inputs result in a multiplier similar to the one associated with 
capital in a neoclassical growth model. This multiplier is large because of a high share of intermediates in output and thus helps 
account for differences in incomes across countries. 
2 India implemented significant liberalization in both goods and services between 1991 and 2005.  Major liberalization reforms 
began in 1991 as part of an IMF structural adjustment package, designed to combat balance of payments imbalances, and 
continued with the government‟s eighth four year plan from 1992-1996. As we discuss below, the pace of reform in services 
was gradual and sought to balance a variety of economic and political considerations. 3 
 
most intransigent policy restrictions today are in services.
3 Convincing evidence that these  restrictions 
penalize the politically cherished manufacturing sector could provide an impetus to reform. 
 
Exploring  whether  there  is  a  systematic  link  between  liberalization  in  services  sectors  and  the 
performance of firms in downstream manufacturing industries requires three types of information: a 
measure of policy reform in services, a performance measure for manufacturing firms and information on 
the linkages between different sectors of the economy.  
 
In preparation for this study, a large amount of information on the state and the history of services reform 
was gathered by local consultants employed by the World Bank in India. The information was then 
condensed into a composite time -varying policy index for each sector modeled after a similar index 
compiled by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development for countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe and reported in their flagship publication Transition Report 2004. The index can take on values 
ranging from 0 to 5 and is available for four sectors: banking, telecoms, transport and insurance for the 
time period 1991-2004, the period over which most of the significant reforms took place. Constructing the 
index is one of the contributions of this study, as it can be used in other research on the impact of Indian 
policy reforms. 
 
The performance of manufacturing firms is measured on the basis of total factor productivity estimates 
obtained from sector-specific production functions. To take into account the possible simultaneity bias 
between  unobserved  productivity  shocks  and  input  choices,  we  follow  the  procedure  outlined  by 
Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) which builds on the earlier work by Olley and Pakes (1996) and 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Unlike the latter method, the approach we follow allows for more plausible 
assumptions about the timing of the firm‟s decision regarding input choices and optimization errors. 
 
To examine the link between the performance of services users and services sector reforms, our analysis 
relates the productivity of manufacturing firms to the state of liberalization in services sectors weighted 
by the respective manufacturing sector‟s reliance on inputs from each services sector. The reliance of 
manufacturing  sectors  on  services  inputs  is  assessed  based  on  the  national  input-output  matrix.  Our 
                                                 
3 Even in industrial countries, the supposed strategic importance of some services has led to the persistence of restrictions. For 
example, witness the barriers to foreign participation in air and maritime transport as well as certain types of communication 
services in the United States, and the difficulty in completing the single market for services in the European Union.   4 
 
identifying assumption is that the effect of reforms in specific services sectors should be more pronounced 
in manufacturing sectors relying more heavily on those services inputs. The specification also controls for 
the level of import tariffs on output and inputs as well as for firm and year fixed effects. 
 
The analysis is based on firm-level data from the Capitaline database, a commercially available database 
including balance sheets,  profit and loss statements,  and ownership information  on large private and 
public firms operating in India. Firms included in the database account for 62 percent of India‟s total 
manufacturing output during the period covered by the analysis. Our data set forms an unbalanced panel 
covering 3,771 firms or 22,558 firm-year observations during the 1993-2005 period.   
 
Our  results  suggest  that  policy  reforms  in  services  sectors  had  a  significant  impact  on  firms  in  the 
manufacturing sector. The aggregate effect of services liberalization was an increase in productivity of 
11.7 percent for domestic firms and 13.2 percent for foreign firms for a one-standard-deviation increase in 
the liberalization index. When the individual services sectors are examined in the same specification, a 
one-standard-deviation  change  in  the  banking  sector  index  corresponds  to  a  6.5  percent  change  in 
productivity  for  both  domestic  and  foreign  firms.  A  one-standard-deviation  change  in  the 
telecommunications liberalization index corresponds to a 7.2 percent increase in productivity for domestic 
firms and a 9.8 percent increase in productivity for foreign firms. A similar change in the transport index 
leads to a 19 percent improvement in productivity of all firms. Only foreign firms appear to benefit from 
the insurance reform enjoying a productivity boost of 3.3 percent. 
 
Our results are confirmed by an instrumental variables approach in which we instrument for reform in 
India using measures of services reform in two countries that  can be viewed as  India‟s competitors, 
namely China and  Indonesia. The results are also robust to focusing on structural breaks in services 
reform instead of using the reform index. Finally, the results remain unchanged if we control for de-
licensing and lifting of restrictions on FDI inflows in a given manufacturing sector. 
 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the related literature. Section III describes services 
liberalization in  India between 1990 and 2005 and presents some evidence on its impact. Section  IV 
describes the data and the construction of the liberalization index and reviews our estimation procedures. 




II.   Related Literature 
 
A review of the relevant literature reveals that: India‟s manufacturing revival has been attributed to almost 
everything except its services reforms; even research on  other countries tends to attribute changes in 
manufacturing performance to goods trade liberalization and foreign direct investment; and, in the few 
instances where the role of services reform is considered, the focus has been on specific services like 
banking or infrastructural services alone.  
 
India‟s liberalization in the 1990s has made it a rich environment for research on the effects of policy 
reform on manufacturing performance. Considering the 1991 reforms as a single event, Krishna and Mitra 
(1998)  find  both  price  and  productivity  effects  at  the  firm  level.  Khandelwal  and  Topalova  (2011) 
examine  reductions  in  trade  protection  in  individual  industries  and  find  that  procompetitive  forces, 
resulting from lower tariffs on final goods, as well as access to better inputs, due to lower input tariffs, 
increased firm-level productivity, with the latter having a larger impact. Sivadasan (2009) considers the 
liberalization of both the trade and FDI regime in manufacturing and concludes that both increased firm-
level productivity. In a descriptive analysis, Goldberg et al. (2009) show that trade reform spurred imports 
of previously unavailable products. New imported inputs often originated from more advanced countries 
and  new  imported  varieties  exhibited  higher  unit  values  relative  to  existing  imports.  Goldberg  et  al. 
(20011a) find that lower input tariffs accounted on average for 31 percent of the new products introduced 
by Indian firms, which suggests that an important consequence of the input tariff liberalization was to 
relax technological constraints through firms‟ access to new imported inputs that were unavailable prior to 
the liberalization. 
 
Other key contributions have looked beyond policy in manufacturing per se, but focused primarily on 
institutional factors affecting the distribution of benefits from reforms and liberalization across industries 
and states.  Besley and Burgess (2004) exploit variation in labor regulations across Indian states and find 
that labor market reforms were a significant determinant of manufacturing output per capita.  Aghion, 
Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti (2008) show that the effects of liberalizing the system of central controls 
regulating entry and production activity were stronger in areas where organized labor was relatively weak, 6 
 
arguing that firms were better able to adapt to the new regime in regions where regulations were more 
pro-industry.  Harrison  et  al.  (2011)  find  that  market-share  reallocations  played  an  important  role  in 
aggregate productivity gains immediately following the start of India‟s trade reforms in 1991. However, 
aggregate productivity gains during the overall 20-year period from 1985 to 2004 were driven largely by 
improvements in average productivity, which can be attributed to India‟s trade liberalization and FDI 
reforms. Goldberg et al. (2011b) investigate the impact of liberalization on Indian firms‟ product choice 
and find little evidence of “creative destruction” in the 1990s, i.e. Indian firms infrequently discontinued 
product lines even during a period of trade and structural reform.  They argue that remnants of industrial 
licensing and rigid labor market regulation in the Indian economy prevented firms from adjusting fully to 
reforms. 
 
The emphasis on attributing changes in manufacturing performance to changes in trade, investment and 
labor market policies in goods characterizes much of the existing empirical work on liberalization in 
developing countries. For instance, Pavcnik (2002) uses plant level data from Chile to find that trade 
liberalization forces exit of the least productive firms while increasing productivity of the remaining firms 
in the import competing sectors. Amiti and Konings (2007) delve deeper into the channels through which 
liberalization affects productivity by separately identifying the impact on Indonesian manufacturing of 
input and output tariff reductions, and find that the positive effect from increased availability of inputs to 
production is twice as strong as the effect from import competition. Halpern et al. (2009) estimate a 
structural model of importers using product-level data for all Hungarian manufacturing firms and reach a 
similar conclusion. 
 
Empirical research on liberalization of foreign direct investment has produced mixed results. Aitken and 
Harrison  (1999)  find  what  they  term  „the  market  stealing  effect‟  of  foreign  direct  investment  which 
swamps the positive effect of technology transfer on firm productivity in Venezuela. Javorcik (2004) 
explicitly distinguishes between intra- and inter-industry effects of foreign direct investment using firm 
level data from Lithuania and finds that foreign direct investment has a positive productivity effect on 
supplier industries but no significant effect on local competitors in the same industry. Javorcik and Li 




Downstream spillovers arising from policy reform and foreign participation in the services sectors are 
qualitatively  different  from  those  arising  from  foreign  direct  investment  in  manufacturing  industries. 
Disruption in the provision of services can result in large delays in production and product delivery, high 
information  costs  and  an  inability  to  invest  in  potentially  profitable  new  activities.    There  has  not, 
however, been much empirical analysis of the downstream effects of services reform, and the few existing 
studies have focused on specific services sectors, usually banking.
4  Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that 
financial development increases growth. They weight industries by dependence on outside financing  (as 
estimated from US data) and find that firms which are more dependent on external financing gain more 
from financial development than other firms.  Bertrand, Scholar and Thesmar (2004) demonstrate th at 
banking deregulation in France in 1985 led to improved productivity in manufacturing firms.  Entry and 
exit rates increased following liberalization, suggesting that less productive firms had been protected by 
the  easy  access  to  credit  allocated  to  large   firms  by  the  previously  nationalized  banking  sector.  
Productivity effects were  particularly strong in banking -dependent sectors.  Aghion and Schankerman 
(1999) identify channels through which infrastructure and institutions affect entry and exit. They generate 
a Dixit-Stiglitz model to demonstrate that infrastructure investment increases the probability of entry by 
low cost firms and discourages entry by high cost firms.  Thus, infrastructure development is likely to 
improve  economic  performance  if it  reduc es  transactions  costs  thereby  increasing  competition  and 
fostering Schumpeterian “creative destruction.”  
 
The present paper is most closely related to Arnold, Javorcik and Mattoo (2011) which uses firm-level 
data  to  show  that  increased  foreign  participation  in  services  provision  led  to  improvement  in 
manufacturing productivity in the Czech Republic in the period 1998-2003.  The current paper studies the 
more  complex  and  dynamic  Indian  context  with  new  data  on  and  measures  of  services  reform. 
Furthermore, while the previous paper considered the services sector as a whole, in the present paper, by 
separating  the  liberalization  measures  into  measures  for  banking,  telecommunications,  transport  and 
insurance services, we are able to identify the impact of key reforms in individual sectors. Finally, in 
contrast  to  the  previous  paper,  we  distinguish  between  the  implications  of  services  liberalization  for 
domestic and foreign manufacturers.  
 
                                                 
4 There is some work on the economy-wide effects of services reform. Mattoo, Rathindran and Subramanian (2006) show that 
services liberalization leads to higher levels of economic growth.  Eschenbach and Hoekman (2006) find similar evidence for 
Eastern Europe. 8 
 
 
III.  Services Reform in India 
 
After decades of state dominance, India‟s economic landscape was transformed with the liberalization of 
manufacturing in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the liberalization of services during the 1990s.  This 
section  describes  the  key  reforms  in  individual  services  sectors,  their  determinants  and  their 
consequences.  We first provide some evidence that the pattern and pace of services reform reflected 
sector-specific political forces that were to an extent exogenous to the developments in the downstream 
manufacturing sector.  We then show that the reforms had an impact on the performance of the services 
sectors.   
 
The Genesis and Pattern of Reform in Services Sectors 
In the 1980s, the services sectors in India were dominated by state enterprises, there were restrictions on 
entry  by  private  domestic  and  foreign  providers,  and  prices  of  services  were  largely  fixed  by  the 
government  (World  Bank,  2004).  The  1990s  saw  significant  liberalization,  with  greater  freedom  of 
establishment  to  domestic  and,  in  some  cases,  foreign  providers,  greater  operational  autonomy  for 
providers, and greater reliance on market-based allocation mechanisms.  
The pace of policy reform has, however, varied across sectors and been determined primarily by political 
considerations (Hoekman, Mattoo and Sapir, 2007). Sectors in which privatization and competition would 
mean restructuring and large scale lay-offs were slower to benefit from the reforms than those in which 
incumbents could remain profitable and employment would not decline even as foreign and local private 
competitors entered the market. Reforms were also slower to materialize where it was feared that they 
could cause a reduction in access to services for poor or rural communities. Most political economy 
explanations for the pace and pattern of reforms point to considerations in the services sectors themselves 
rather than in downstream industries.
5 
                                                 
5 Chari and Gupta (2008) provide evidence that the de-licensing reforms in India in 1991 categorized certain more concentrated 
and less competitive industries as strategic and shielded them from foreign competition by maintaining barriers  to foreign 
direct investment. They find that profitable state-owned enterprises were likely to be protected, particularly in capital-intensive 
industries. Lobbying power by state banks and other services companies in India is likely to have been a factor in delaying 9 
 
 
Services sectors in India can today be separated into three broad categories: significantly liberalized, 
moderately liberalized and closed. The telecommunications sector was operated solely by the central 
government  prior  to  1992,  when  the  government  began  to  issue  select  operating  licenses  to  private 
providers. In 1994, cellular service began and the government announced the National Telecom Policy 
which improved the environment for private investment. In 2002, the government fully opened the long 
distance  sector  of  the  telecom  industry  to  private  competition  and  eliminated  all  restrictions  on  the 
number of service providers, except in areas where limits are dictated by the availability of spectrum. 
Foreign ownership limitations were also significantly relaxed and  now range from 74 percent to 100 
percent across different segments.  
To those accustomed to the glacial pace of reform in India, the telecommunications experience seems 
highly unusual. Discussions with policy-makers suggest that technology trumped all other considerations 
in  this  sector  and  India  sought  to  exploit  new  technological  possibilities  by  rapidly  introducing 
competition.
6 Public sector incumbents reincarnated as more or less successful participants with a stake in 
a competitive and rapidly growing market.  The number of telephone subscribers has increased rapidly, 
with most of the increases taking place in private  telecommunications services providers (OECD, 2011). 
The expansion in scale dwarfed any adverse effects of diminished labor intensity–employment grew by as 
much as a third in the six  years following the first significant liberalization in 1994. It also became 
evident  that  better  access  to  services  could  be  achieved  than  what  had  been  possible  with  public 
monopoly, attenuating concerns regarding distributional equity and weakness of regulatory capacity.  
In the moderately liberalized sectors, Indian firms are disadvantaged by the legacies of past policies and 
are ill-equipped to compete. The best example is the banking sector where nationalization in 1969 of the 
largest private sector banks led to a sector dominated by public sector banks committed to directing credit 
to  areas  identified  by  the  government  as  priorities.
7  Directed lending  and  interest  rate  regulations 
prescribed the credit portfolios which banks were required to hold, putting into question the long term 
                                                                                                                                                                            
liberalization of the services sectors into the mid-1990s and in excluding them from the general goods liberalization during the 
rapid trade reforms which took place in 1991.   
   
6 The authors discussed the reform experience with B.K. Zutshi, the first Chairman of the  Telecom Regulatory Authority of 
India (TRAI), and H.V. Singh, the Secretary and Director of Economy Policy at the TRAI in December 2006. 
7  The Bank Company Acquisition Act of 1969, quoted in Burgess and Pande (2003), explicitly recognizes the goal of 
expanding credit to priority sectors through government expansion of the banking system. 10 
 
solvency of many banks (Reddy, 2005). Banks were also required to hold large percentages  of their 
portfolios in government securities bought at concessional interest rates. In 1977, the government began 
requiring any bank that wanted to open a branch in an area which already had a bank branch to open four 
branches in (rural) areas with no financial services (Burgess and Pande, 2005). The effect was to generate 
excessive staffing levels, unprofitable rural branches and large levels of non-performing loans. The close 
relationship existing between the banks, the government and central bank created the potential for moral 
hazard as banks expected government intervention in the event of a failure (Reddy, 2002).  
Liberalization  of  the  banking  sector  was  handled  by  the  Reserve  Bank  of  India  with  a  focus  on 
maintaining  the  viability  of  existing  banks  while  increasing  competition  and  efficiency  in  the  sector 
(Reddy, 2005). In 1994, liberalization began with increased approval of private sector banks. In 2001, the 
government began deregulation of the interest rate, and in 2002, foreign participation in the banking 
sector was allowed up to 49 percent in private banks. There was also an increase in the approval rate for 
the entry of new private banks. At the same time, India has made banking sector liberalization conditional 
on improving the competitiveness of public sector banks through measures such as mergers, voluntary 
worker retirement schemes, and the creation of asset management companies to deal with non-performing 
assets. A 2004 rule allowed foreign banks to acquire up to a 74 percent stake in branches listed by the 
Reserve Bank of India as having weak portfolios; foreign institutions are allowed only a 20 percent stake 
in branches which are performing well. Foreign banks may now operate through licensed branches and as 
fully owned subsidiaries, but a few key restrictions remain in the banking sector. There is a cap on the 
number of licenses for branches at 20 per year for both new and existing banks, and the share of foreign 
bank assets in total banking assets may not exceed 15 percent. Despite these limitations in the pace of 
reforms, banking concentration has decreased visibly and the market share of new banks has increased to 
around 25 percent (OECD, 2011). 
The insurance sector has been liberalized more slowly than the other sectors. Prior to liberalization, the 
insurance sector was controlled by the Ministry of Finance through publicly owned companies. In 1999, 
the Insurance Regulatory Development Authority bill was passed which allowed private sector companies 
to  enter the insurance  market.  Foreign  equity  participation in  the insurance sector is  restricted to  26 
percent and foreign firms are allowed entry only through partnerships or joint ventures. The funds of 
policyholders must be retained within the country and there is compulsory exposure to the rural and social 11 
 
sector, including crop insurance. Entry into the insurance market by private sector providers finally began 
in 2002 when twelve private sector insurers entered the market.  
All  subsectors  of  transport  services  were  operated  primarily  by  public  sector  companies  prior  to 
liberalization.  Air  transport  was  run  by  two  publicly  owned  carriers,  states  controlled  the  ports  for 
maritime industries, and a large segment of the shipping sector was heavily regulated and dominated by 
publicly owned companies. In 1997, foreign direct investment up to 40 percent was allowed in airlines, 74 
percent foreign direct investment was allowed in port construction, and private sector companies were 
allowed to contract for infrastructure maintenance and construction. In air transport, for example, the 
remarkable increases in passenger traffic can be attributed almost entirely to private entrants (OECD, 
2011). Yet transportation sectors remain subject to state level regulations which vary significantly across 
states, with trucking particularly susceptible to local political pressures. 
Professional services including accounting, legal, and other services sectors such as retail distribution, 
postal and rail transport services are formally closed to foreign participation.
8 FDI is not allowed in the 
accounting and legal sectors. Within distribution services, FDI is not allowed in the retail segment  (with 
some narrow exceptions, such as single -brand retail) but there are no limits in other areas, except the 
requirement of approval for commission agents, franchising services and wholesale trade.  The closed 
sectors are characterized by domestic firms that are sub-optimal in size and handicapped by an inhibiting 
and  weak regulatory environment.  Many Indian services in closed sectors   are highly fragmented by 
international standards.
9 Here adjustment and employment concerns are the dominant factor s impeding 
liberalization.  
A more detailed survey of the liberalization reforms  is provided in on-line Appendix A (attached at the 
end of the paper). 
 
 
                                                 
8 As an exception to this general rule, single-brand retailers are allowed. 
9 For example, there are 100,000 chartered accountants in India and 43,000 audit firms, with an average of two chartered 
accountants per firm as compared to an average of between 350 and 1500 chartered accountants in the typical affiliates of the 
“big four” accounting firms. In retail distribution, the penetration of supermarkets in India is only 2 percent compared to 55 
percent in Malaysia and 36 percent in Brazil (World Bank, 2004).  12 
 
The Impact of Reform 
 
The elimination of barriers to entry in services provoked a dramatic response from foreign and domestic 
providers (Gordon and Gupta, 2004). FDI inflows into services following liberalization by far exceeded 
those into other sectors. Ten percent of FDI inflows during 1990-2005 went into the transport sector, 9.6 
percent of the inflows were into the telecommunications sector, and 9.6 percent of the inflows were into 
the financial and other services sector (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2008). At the same time, the 
services sector grew by an average of 11 percent per year, with the more liberalized sectors generally 
growing at relatively faster rates (Chart 1, and Eichengreen and Gupta, 2010). The share of services in 
overall value added rose from 39 percent in 1993 to 50 percent in 2004 (National Accounts Statistics, 
2005, constant 1993 Rs).  
Growth  has  been  particularly  strong  in  the  services  sectors  on  which  we  focus  in  this  paper:  
communication  services  displayed  average  annual  growth  rates  of  13.6  percent  in  the  1990s,  while 
banking grew by 12.7 percent on average, transport grew at an average rate of 6.9 percent and insurance 
grew at a rate of 6.7 percent (Gordon and Gupta, 2004). Output per worker in the services sectors in India 
has  increased  by  over  7.5  percent  per  year  during  the  1990s,  clearly  outpacing  the  agricultural  or 
industrial sectors (Bosworth and Collins, 2008, p.56). Other evidence suggests that strong total factor 
productivity  growth  was at  the root of  this remarkable performance, not  capital  deepening or higher 
markups  (Bosworth,  Collins,  and  Virmani,  2006;  Gordon  and  Gupta,  2004).  Indeed,  services  prices 
decreased  relative  to  manufacturing  prices,  as  indicated  by  a  slower  pace  of  growth  in  the  services 
deflator than the overall GDP deflator.  
The reforms produced striking improvements in sectoral performance. In 1990, the average turn-around 
time for a container at major ports in India was 8 days, and at major Mumbai ports the average was 11. 
This meant that manufacturing companies exporting their products or importing inputs had to factor in 
more than a week of transit time for their goods, which increased the cash outlays necessary for exporting 
and importing. By 2005, the average turn-around time at major ports in India had decreased to 3.5 days, 
with 4.5 days as the average time at Mumbai ports (see Charts 2 and 3). This reduction in transit time is 
likely to have improved the ability of Indian firms to compete in highly variable markets such as textiles 
and electronics in which the ability to respond quickly to changes in demand is crucial. 
 13 
 
Banerjee and Duflo (2004) find that prior to liberalization even at the most efficient public sector banks, 
bank loan approvals in 64 percent of cases were mechanically made for the same loan amount as prior 
loans. The rationing of credit by the public sector reduced the ability of companies to respond to new 
business  opportunities  and  finance  improvements  in  products  or  production  processes.  Because 
liberalization allowed banks to set interest rates at their risk adjusted cost of capital and choose diversified 
loan portfolios, by 2005 the level of investment by banks increased to 4.75 times the size of investment in 
1994. The share of investment by foreign and private banks also increased during the period from 11 
percent in 1994 to 24 percent in 2005. Despite the slow pace of reforms, credit provision and investment 




Before the beginning of th e reforms in telecommunications,   the sector was controlled by MTNL, a 
publicly owned company which provided local telephone service, and VSNL, a publicly owned company 
which provided long distance service. Both companies were plagued by faults, which averaged 19 faults 
per 100 stations per month in 1991. In addition, service was poorly distributed and access to new lines 
was  difficult.
11  Businesses  were  severely  handicapped  in  their  ability  to  communicate  with  their 
customers and suppliers and to coordinate activity across plants. Liberalization has interacted powerfully 
with technological change to transform the telecommunications market.   By 2005, the number of faults 
had declined to 7.5 percent and the waiting lists for telephone services had virtually disappeared in urban 
areas (Charts 4 and 5). Even rural customers, projected by critics of the liberalization reforms to lose from 
the privatization, saw increases in access to phone lines.  Access to internet services, provided initially 
only by MTNL, increased quickly as private providers were allowed to enter the market (Chart 6). 
In the 1980s, air transport providers and several of the largest shipping companies were publicly -owned 
companies. After liberalization, increasing competition from foreign companies put pressure on Indian 
carriers to improve their performance. They responded positively, and operating efficiency increased. In 
fact, operating revenue per employee in Indian airlines increased over 5 times over the period 1990-2004 
from 0.5 million per employee to 2.5 million per employee.  The increased efficiency led to continued 
                                                 
10 More recently, during the financial crisis, credit provision by foreign banks shrank.   
11 The communications minister in the 1980s, C.M. Stephens, declared in parliament that telephones were a luxury, not a right, 
and that anyone unsatisfied with their service was welcome to return their phone as there was an eight year waiting list of 
people seeking telephone service (Panagariya, 2008 p.372). 14 
 
growth of Indian carriers in the period 1990-2005, of nearly 15 percent yearly in passenger traffic and 11 
percent yearly in cargo traffic (Directorate General of Civil Aviation, 2006).
12  
Until 2002, private sector competition in the insurance market was proscribed, severely limiting the range 
of insurance services on offer. Market penetration of insurance quickly increased  following the entry of 
private and foreign insurers. After decades of public monopoly, premiums were equal to only 1.9 percent 
of GDP in 1999-2000, but they jumped to 2.86 percent of GDP by 2002-2003 (Insurance Regulatory and 
Development Authority, 2004). Government projections at the time of liberalization suggested that market 
participation by foreign firms in 2005 would reach only 5 percent of the market, but by November 2005, 
private firms with foreign shareholding had acquired a 34 percent market share. Over the same period, 
there was limited  contraction by Indian public sector incumbents   (Department of Public Enterprises, 
2003).
13  
In sum, liberalization led to a metamorphosis of services in India from a narrow range of products of sub-
standard quality and poor distribution to the current environment in which service providers are highly 
competitive and offer their consumers, including manufacturing firms, a wide range of new and high 
quality services products.   
 
IV. Empirical Strategy 
 
In this paper, we investigate whether there is a systematic link between liberalization in services sectors 
and the performance of firms in downstream manufacturing industries. This exercise requires three pieces 
of information: a measure of policy reform in services, a performance measure for manufacturing firms 
and information on the linkages between different sectors of the economy.  
 
 
   
                                                 
12 Recently, certain private providers, such as Kingfisher Airlines, have experienced financial difficulties 
13  National Insurance Company Limited, Calcutta,  New India Assurance Company Limited, Mumbai, and United India 
Insurance Company Limited Chennai each cut their staffs by 10  percent, while Oriental Insurance Company Limited, New 
Delhi cut its staff by 14 percent (India Knowledge @ Wharton,  2006). 15 
 
Measuring Services Reform 
 
In order to make the detailed information on services sector reforms in India, which was gathered for this 
study, amenable to quantitative analysis, we condense the information into a composite policy index for 
each sector. In doing so, we have been guided by a similar index compiled by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development for countries in Central and Eastern Europe and reported in the flagship 
publication Transition Report 2004. This approach starts from a general template of reforms necessary to 
achieve a desirable policy environment, which is then adapted to the specific situation of each sector.  
 
For each services sector k, the time-varying services reform index reformkt ranges from 0 to a maximum 
score of 5. An index value of 0 corresponds to a situation where the public sector is either the only 
relevant provider of services or has a strong grip on private providers, and there is extremely limited 
scope for the market mechanism. Note that all Indian services sectors treated here fall into this highly 
restrictive category before the beginning of economic reforms in the early 1990s. A level of 1 indicates at 
least  some  scope  for  private  sector  participation  and  some  liberalization  of  operational  decisions, 
combined  with  some  very  limited  scope  for  foreign  participation  (limited,  for  example,  by  low  FDI 
ceilings). To qualify for an index value of 2, there must be only a limited degree of interference with 
operational decisions by public authorities, substantial price liberalization, and clear scope for foreign 
participation even if only in narrowly defined segments and as minority shareholders. Still, the state may 
remain a dominant actor in the sector. An index of 3 implies significant scope for private providers, 
including  foreign  ones,  clear  competitive  pressure  on  the  public  incumbents  from  new  entrants,  and 
explicit possibilities for foreign equity participation. A level of 4 is equivalent to little public intervention 
and the freedom of operation of private providers, the possibility of majority foreign ownership, and the 
dominance of private sector entities. Finally, a level of 5 (not attained in any of the sectors considered 
here) would reflect an equal treatment of foreign and domestic providers, a full convergence of regulation 
with international standards and unrestricted entry into the sector. The details of how the index was 
constructed are presented in on-line Appendix B (attached at the end of the manuscript). The index is 





Linkages between Manufacturing Industries and Services Sectors 
 
The next question in our analysis is how to aggregate these sector-specific indices into a single index of 
services reform. Given that some services are likely to be more important for manufacturing industries 
than others, and that this dependence may vary across different manufacturing industries, an unweighted 
average of services sector indices is unlikely to be an appropriate measure of the potential impact of 
upstream services liberalization on the performance of manufacturing firms. Instead, we use information 
on the intensity with which services inputs are used in the production of a given manufacturing sector. In 
particular, we weight each of the reform indices for the four major services sectors (banking, telecom, 
transport and insurance) by the proportion αjk of inputs sourced by the manufacturing sector j from the 




kt jk jt reform Index Services  _           (1) 
 
where αjk is based on the input-output matrix pertaining to 1993, the first year of our sample.
14 Data from 
a national input-output matrix contain information about the  average inter-industry sourcing behavior of 
firms in a given sector of the economy. For an individual firm, the  actual reliance on a given services 
sector  may be somewhat different, but even  if such information were available at the level of each 
individual firm (which it is not), such data would risk being endogenous to the  performance of the firm, 
which would defeat our purpose. By using average information, we lose some precision in measuring the 
reliance of firms on services inputs, but we can be less concerned about the endogeneity of this measure. 
The fact that we use sourcing information from the 1993 input-output matrix should further minimize the 
scope for endogeneity even at the level of the average firm in an industry.  
 
                                                 
14  The  input-output  matrix  includes  66  manufacturing  sectors  and  16  services  sectors.  The  manufacturing  sectors  were 
aggregated to 38 sectors at which sector-specific price deflators were available. The services sectors include:  construction, 
electricity, gas, water supply, railway transport services, other transport services, storage and warehousing, communication, 
trade, hotels and restaurants, banking, insurance, ownership of dwellings, education and research, medical and health, other 
services. Input shares are calculated relative to the total value of inputs sourced.  Banking services constitute on average 5% of 
all inputs, transport 4.4%, telecommunications 1.6% and insurance 1.4%. An alternative normalization, by gross output, leads 
to the same conclusions. 17 
 
In our analysis, we will also distinguish between the effects of reform in individual services sectors. To do 
so, we will construct indices capturing the reform in a particular services sector. For instance, we will 
define 
 
t banking banking j jt reform Index Banking , , _             (2) 
 
where αj,banking reflects the proportion of inputs sourced by the manufacturing sector j from the banking 
sector,  according  to  the  input-output  matrix,  and  reformbanking,t  is  the  state  of  reform  in  the  banking 
industry at time t. We will follow the same approach to construct indices for telecom, insurance and 
transport sectors. 
 
For the banking sector, an alternative measure of financial dependence will help us to test the robustness 
of  the  main  measure.  This  alternative  is  based  on  Rajan  and  Zingales  (1998),  who  compute  sector 
averages of financial dependence based on US data and argue that this is a suitable measure for firms‟ 
technologically induced demand for external finance in an environment with well-developed financial 
markets. The measure is based on a comparison between firms‟ investment outlays and own cash flow.  
 
 
Measuring the Performance of Manufacturing Firms 
 
Our goal is to provide a fuller explanation of the remarkable improvement in the performance of the 
Indian manufacturing sector following the post-1991 economic reforms.  We use firm-level data from the 
Capitaline  database,  a  commercially  available  database  including  balance  sheets,  profit  and  loss 
statements, and ownership information on large private and public firms operating in India to measure the 
performance of manufacturing firms. The database covers 62 percent of India‟s manufacturing output 
during the period considered by the analysis, and includes 11,939 firms, of which 5,236 operate in the 
manufacturing sector. The data set forms an unbalanced panel covering the period 1993-2005. Firms‟ 
industry  affiliations  follow  India‟s  National  Industry  Classification  (NIC)  which  encompasses  the 
manufacturing sectors. After cleaning the data and discarding firms not reporting information on output or 
production inputs, we are left with 3,771 firms or 22,558 firm-year observations.  
 18 
 
A  consistent  measurement  of  firm  performance  is  crucial  to  our  analysis.  We  use  the  total  factor 
productivity (TFP) as our outcome of interest. To control for a possible simultaneity bias arising from the 
endogeneity  of  a  firm‟s  input  selection,  which  will  exist  if  a  firm  responds  to  productivity  shocks 
unobservable  to  the  econometrician  by  adjusting  its  variable  input  choices,  we  follow  the  method 
proposed by Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006). Ackerberg et al. build on the widely used estimation 
procedures  proposed  by  Olley  and  Pakes  (1996)  and  Levinsohn  and  Petrin  (2003).  Unlike  the  latter 
method, their approach allows for more plausible assumptions about the timing of the firm‟s decision 
regarding input choices and optimization errors. 
 
We use the Ackerberg et al. method to estimate sector-specific production functions and obtain the TFP as 
the residual from this estimation.
15 We group some smaller industries together in order to facilitate the 
estimation.
16 Following the advice of Ackerberg et al., we use value added as the dependent variable in 
the production function. Value added is defined as the  sales of firm i in year t less the value of material, 
services and energy inputs. All components of value added are expressed in real terms. Capital and labor 
inputs (expressed in real terms) are included as independent variables. Material and services inputs (in 
real terms) are used to proxy for the productivity shocks.  
 
Nominal output is deflated by a set of wholesale price indices disaggregated at the 2-digit level, while 
capital inputs are calculated from detailed data on net values of land, buildings, machinery and computers, 
all deflated by the relevant sector deflators. In the absence of data on the number of workers employed, 
the labor input is calculated by normalizing the wage bill of each firm by the average wage prevailing in a 
given 2-digit sector in a given year. Materials are deflated by input-output coefficient weighted sector 
deflators  based  on  the  wholesale  price  index.  Energy  inputs  are  deflated  using  National  Accounts 
Statistics price indices for “Fuel, Power, Light  and Lubricants.”  Services inputs are aggregated from 
detailed data on reported expenses on travel, transport, legal services and accounting, and non-interest 
banking expenses. These items are deflated using a weighted average of services sector deflators from the 
national accounts statistics. Given that our interest is in upstream services reform, a proper accounting for 
services inputs at the firm level is essential to control for changes in the intensity with which firms use 
                                                 
15 We are grateful to Carolina Villegas-Sanchez for sharing with us a STATA routine implementing the procedure. 
16 The industry groupings are: food and tobacco; textiles; garments and leather goods; wood, paper and printing; petroleum 
products and chemicals; rubber and plastics; non-metallic minerals, iron and steel; metal products; machinery, office, electrical 
and communication equipment; lifting, medical and industrial equipment; motor vehicles and other transport equipment. 
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services in their production, in response to increased product offerings in the service sectors. Summary 
statistics for all the variables are presented in Table 1. 
 
To  establish  whether  there  exists  a  link  between  the  performance  of  manufacturing  firms  and 
liberalization of upstream services sectors, we regress the TFP of a manufacturing firm i operating in 
industry j at time t on the aggregated Services_Indexjt-1 lagged one period or disaggregated indices of 
services reform. We control for foreign ownership, trade liberalization, firm and year fixed effects. Our 
principal estimation equation has the following form:  
 
it t it jt jt jt i ijt Foreign tariff Input Tariff Index Services TFP                  4 1 3 1 2 1 1   _ ln   (3) 
 
Services sectors were not the only item on the post-1991 reform agenda in India. Continued reductions in 
manufactured  product  tariff  rates  occurring  during  the  same  period  may  also  have  influenced 
manufacturing productivity. To control for changes in tariff rates, we include lagged output tariffs in the 
same manufacturing sector (Tariffjt-1) and a weighted measure of input tariffs (Input tariffjt-1). The weights 
of the input tariffs are taken from the 1993 input-output matrix, while the aggregation of individual tariff 
lines to the 2-digit sector level is achieved using the 1990 import weights. The information on tariffs was 
obtained from the World Bank‟s WITS database.
17 
 
As many studies find that  foreign affiliates tend to outperform domestic producers ( see for instance, 
Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Arnold and Javorcik, 2009), we include an indicator for foreign-owned firms, 
equal to one if the foreign ownership share in firm  i is above 10% at time t (Foreignit). In an expanded 
specification, we will allow for differential effects of services reform on domestic and foreign firms by 
interacting Foreignit with the Services_Indexjt-1. 
 
The  dependent  variable  is  firm-specific,  but  our  variables  of  interest  vary  at  the  sector-year  level, 
therefore, we cluster standard errors at the sector-year level. 
 
                                                 
17 The authors are grateful to Rajesh Mehta for providing tariff data for the years in which the figures were missing from 
WITS. 20 
 
As a benchmark, we also use OLS to estimate an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function. To make 
it comparable to the Ackerberg et al. procedure, we regress real firm value added (defined as above) on 
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where VAijt stands for the value added of firm i observed in year t (and manufacturing industry j), Kit 
denotes capital, and Lit labor. Note that we allow the coefficients on capital and labor inputs to differ 
across 11 manufacturing sectors. As in specification (3), we include firm and year fixed effects and cluster 
standard errors at the sector-year level. 
 
Our point estimates for the production function coefficients, presented in Table 2, have reasonable values. 
On average, the labor coefficient is 0.73 in the OLS and 0.75 in the Ackerberg et al. specification, and the 
capital coefficient is equal to 0.27 in both cases. In 9 of 11 industries, the coefficient on the capital input 
is  higher  in  Ackerberg  et  al.  procedure,  which  is  what  we  would  expect  to  observe  under  plausible 




   
                                                 
18 A specification with output on the left-hand side and industry-specific coefficients on material inputs, services inputs and 
energy leads to very similar results. 21 
 




Our baseline regression results from estimating equation (4) are presented in Table 3. We find that the 
aggregate services index has a positive and highly significant coefficient estimate, suggesting a strong 
role for services liberalization in explaining manufacturing firm productivity in India. A one-standard-
deviation change in the aggregate services index improves manufacturing productivity on average by 9.1 
percent.  
 
We also enter the individual service sector reform indices into the regression one by one. We find positive 
and  statistically  significant  effects  of  banking,  telecom  and  transport  reforms.  For  banking,  both  our 
standard input-output weighted index and the Rajan-Zingales weighted measure yield similarly significant 
results. There is no evidence that liberalization of the insurance industry led to a better performance of 
manufacturing firms. 
  
When we enter the individual sector indices simultaneously (column 7 of Table 3), the banking, the 
telecom and the transport index maintain their positive and significant coefficients. The results from this 
regression suggest that telecom and transport liberalization have the strongest effects on productivity. A 
one-standard-deviation increase in liberalization of the telecom industry yields a 8.8 percent increase in 
productivity,  and  a  one-standard-deviation  change  in  transport  improves  productivity  by  14  percent. 
Banking reform has a 4.4 percent productivity effect, while the effect for the insurance sector is not 
significant at the conventional levels.   
 
Alternatively, we can focus on the magnitude of the effect corresponding to a one-unit change in the value 
of the liberalization index. For instance,  allowing  firms  greater operational  autonomy and enhancing 
scope of foreign participation (change in the index from one to two) leads to a productivity increase of 1.7 
percent when the banking sector is reformed, 2.7 percent when the telecom sector is liberalized and 19 
percent when the change pertains to the transport industry. 
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Over the period of our sample, we cannot identify a significant effect from changes in tariff rates on 
manufacturing productivity.
19 We also find that foreign affiliates tend to exhibit higher productivity than 
domestic firms which is consistent with the conclusions of the existing literature (Aitken and Harrison, 
1999; Arnold and Javorcik, 2009). 
 
In Table 4, we present the results with our preferred TFP measure estimated based on the Ackerberg et al. 
method. We first apply this method to estimate production functions for each of the 11 sectors separately, 
and then we regress the TFP obtained from these regressions on services and trade liberalization variables, 
the foreign affiliate dummy as we ll as firm and year fixed effects.  Using the Ackerberg et al.  measure 
leads to three changes in the results. First, the estimated coefficients become larger while maintaining their 
significance levels. Second, the insurance index, which did not reach conventional significance levels in 
Table 3, now appears to be statistically significant at the 10 percent level in one specification. Third, the 
transport index now appears to be statistically significant in both specifications where individual measures 
of services reform enter jointly. 
 
When the individual services sectors are examined in the last column of Table 4, a one-standard-deviation 
change in the banking sector index corresponds to a 6.6 percent change in productivity. A one-standard-
deviation change in the telecommunications liberalization index corresponds to a  8.4 percent increase in 
productivity. A similar change in the transport index leads to a  18.8  percent improvement in firm 
performance. No statistically significant effect is found for the insur ance sector reform.  As before, the 




Do Foreign Firms Benefit More from Services Liberalization? 
 
Our finding of a significant productivity premium for foreign owned firms is common in the literature. 
But does ownership also affect the ability of firms to reap the benefits of upstream services reform? 
Liberalization allows entry of foreign services firms which may have stronger links with foreign-owned 
                                                 
19 In a recent paper, Bollard, Klenow and Sharma (2010) also find that productivity growth in Indian manufacturing since the 
1990s is not robustly related to tariff reductions. It is also possible that we do not find significant effects because most of the 
tariff cuts took place prior to the time covered by our sample. 
20 In regressions, not reported to save space, we also show that our conclusions are robust to using a translog production 
function. 23 
 
manufacturing firms and whose local presence could therefore provide greater benefits to foreign-owned 
manufacturing  firms.  Moreover,  accustomed  to  doing  business  in  environments  with  well-developed 
services sectors, foreign firms may derive larger benefits from improvements in services industries. In 
order to test this hypothesis, we estimate an expanded specification which includes interaction effects 
between the services index and the foreign ownership indicator.  
 
The interaction between foreign ownership and services liberalization is positive and significant for the 
aggregate measure (see Table 5). This is also true in all cases when services indices enter one by one, 
confirming our intuition that the productivity effect of services liberalization is stronger for foreign owned 
firms. This increased effect for foreign owned firms is consistent across services sectors when tested 
individually, but is not significant for the banking and the transport sector when all services indices enter 
the same model. This may be because multinational firms are relatively well-equipped able to procure 
banking and transport services internationally, and are therefore less reliant on the respective domestic 
sectors.  
 
The differential impact of liberalization on foreign firms is remarkably strong in the telecommunications 
sector.  A  standard  deviation  increase  in  the  telecommunications  index  increases  productivity  by  7.2 
percent for domestic firms while it increases productivity by 9.8 percent for foreign owned firms. Given 
the greater need for coordination across national borders, one may find this result intuitive. As for the 
insurance  reform,  only  foreign  firms  seem  to  be  able  to  appropriate  its  benefits  and  see  a  boost  in 
productivity of 3.3 percent. 
 
 
Controlling for Other Reforms 
 
While many observers have considered decreasing tariff protection to be the key explanation behind the 
productivity enhancements of Indian firms, recent research suggests that a comprehensive approach may 
be  warranted,  encompassing  also  other  policy  changes  taking  place  in  India  (Harrison  et  al.,  2011). 
Against this background, we extend the set of controls in our baseline specification to include industry-24 
 
specific measures of de-licensing and FDI reform.
21 We do not take into account the labor market reform, 
most of which occurred before the first year of our sample 1993 (Ahsan and Pagés, 2009).  
 
To capture the effects of the de-licensing reforms, we use information from Harrison et al.  (2011), who 
extended the data used by Aghion et al. (2008) to 2004, on the basis of Press Notes from the Ministry of 
Commerce  and  Industry. The de-licensing variable is a dummy that takes on a value of one if any 
products in a 3-digit industry have been de-licensed, and zero otherwise. Similarly, the measure of FDI 
reform was compiled by Harrison et al. (2011) also based on Press Notes from the Ministry of Commerce 




In Table 6, we present the results from the modified specification. We find a positive correlation between 
de-licensing and FDI reform and firm productivity. More importantly for the purposes of this paper, our 




Instrumenting the Services Liberalization Index 
 
In order to ensure that our finding of services reforms improving manufacturing performance is not driven 
by reverse causality, we instrument the index of services reform. The intuition behind our instrumental 
variables (IV) approach is that India will react to services liberalization undertaken by other countries, 
especially economies it views as its competitors, such as China and Indonesia. We measure services 
liberalization using the WTO commitments in a given sector. More specifically, we focus on the number 
of commitments made by a country expressed as a percentage of possible commitments. For the years 
prior to the first full year of the WTO membership of a given country (e.g. 2002 for China), the number of 
commitments  equals  zero.  To  create  an  instrument  relevant  to  a  particular  manufacturing  sector,  the 
                                                 
21 According to Harrison et al, by the end of 1991, nearly 85% of industries had been de-licensed, with the share increasing to 
over 90% of industries by the end of the 1990s. The FDI liberalization occurred somewhat more slowly, and only in 2000 all 
industries became eligible for automatic FDI approval, except those requiring an industrial license or meeting several other 
conditions. 
22 We are very grateful to Ann Harrison, Leslie Martin and Shanthi Nataraj for sharing the data with us.  Industries have been 
converted from 3-digit NIC 87 industry codes to 4-digit NIC98 industry codes.  Where direct correspondences were not found, 
averages were used at the 2-digit NIC98 level.   
23 Including these additional controls in all other specifications presented in the paper would not change its conclusions. 25 
 
measure  of  services  liberalization  is  multiplied  by  the  proportion  αjk  of  inputs  sourced  by  the 
manufacturing sector j from the services sector k, as with the services index in equation 1. In this way we 
create  two  instruments:  (i)  pertaining  to  China's  commitments  and  (ii)  pertaining  to  Indonesia's 
commitments. Each instrument varies by time, manufacturing industry and services sector. An alternative 
specification, using instead the commitments of all WTO members yielded similar results (available upon 
request).  
 
The results from IV regressions are reported in Table 7. As expected, the first stage results indicate that 
Indian  services  reform  responded  to  services  liberalization  in  China  and  Indonesia.  The  F-statistics 
suggest that our instruments perform well. The Sargan test does not cast doubt on their validity with the 
exception of the specification focusing on the transport sector.  The second stage confirms our earlier 
finding that services reforms have improved manufacturing performance. This gives us confidence that 
reverse causation is not driving our results.  
 
Alternative Measure of Service Reform 
 
While the construction of our services reform index was undertaken with great care and confirmed by 
extensive consultations with sector experts in India, a composite index is by its very nature always prone 
to  measurement  imperfections.  We  therefore  wish  to  check  the  robustness  of  our  findings  to  more 
parsimonious approaches to measuring services reform. Although a “true” measure of policy reform does 
not exist, it may be possible to identify the key structural break points in policy regimes with greater 
objectivity than is  involved in  the construction of a composite index that  reflects  a judgment of the 
relative importance of specific reforms. Hence we check the previous findings by using a simpler measure 
of structural breaks for each services sector.
24 This is done by identifying the year in which a service 
sector experienced the most transformative policy reform and generating a simple indicator variable that 
divides years into “before” and “after” this structural break. These policy cornerstones in services sectors 
are then weighted by the input-output coefficients linking services and manufacturing sectors, in the same 
way as with the policy index:  
 
Breakjt = ajkIkt                    (5) 
                                                 
24 Note that it is not possible to do this for the aggregate measure as the timing of structural breaks varies from sector to sector. 26 
 
 
where αjk is the share of inputs sourced from services sector k by manufacturing sector j, and Ikt is an 
indicator variable for services sector k taking on the value of one if an observation pertains to the year of 
the structural break year or a later period, and zero otherwise. 
 
The structural  breaks  were determined as  follows.  The most important reforms  in  the banking  sector 
occurred in 2001, when there was full deregulation of the interest rates and banks were allowed greater 
flexibility in choosing borrowers and designing loan terms. Liberalization of the banking sector allowed 
for improved allocation of credit and increased investment by private and foreign banks.  
 
The  most  important  reforms  in  the  telecommunications  sector  in  India  occurred  in  2002,  when  the 
government terminated the VSNL (publicly owned telecommunications company) monopoly and allowed 
free entry into the long distance sector. This policy reform in the telecommunications sector quickly led to 
entry in the sector and intense competition.  
 
For  transportation,  the  most  important  reform  came  in  1997  when  increased  privatization  in  port 
management  was  allowed.  Approval  was  granted  for  up  to  74  percent  foreign  ownership  in  port 
management, foreign and private investment in construction, and increased private and foreign investment 
in aviation. The effect was to make the transportation industry more competitive, which translated into 
gains in the speed with which processes were completed at ports and deliveries were made.  
 
In the insurance industry, 2002 is the most important year of reform, as it marked the registration of 
sixteen new providers, and permission for twelve new insurance providers to enter the market. Yet the 
insurance reforms were slower to be instituted than the other services reforms. 
 
The results obtained from replacing the services index in equation (4) with the variable Breakjt pertaining 
to  individual  services  industries  confirm  our  earlier  findings  (Table  8).  Important  policy  changes  in 
services sectors appear to have left their mark on the performance of manufacturing firms dependent on 
services  inputs.  Strong  productivity  effects  can  be  identified  from  the  banking,  telecommunications, 
insurance and transport sectors, and as in the index regressions, the coefficients are particularly large for 
the telecom and transport sectors. Again when measures for several services industries enter jointly, the 27 
 
insurance measure loses its statistical significance. As is evident from Table 9, these regressions also 
confirm that there is a stronger productivity effect on foreign firms than on domestic firms.  
 
 
Liberalization Year Falsification Test 
 
In order to ensure that the liberalization measures identify effects of reforms rather than spurious effects 
from broader industry-level productivity trends, we test the liberalization discontinuity effect on years 
prior to the reform. If the effect captured by the liberalization breaks were simply related to industry 
trends, we would expect the coefficient on years prior to the reform to be as large and significant as the 
coefficient on our variable of interest.   
 
To implement this test we create a new variable  
 
1 year prior to breakjt = ajkIPkt              (6) 
 
where αjk is the share of inputs sourced from services sector k by manufacturing sector j, and IPkt is an 
indicator variable for services sector k taking on the value of one in the year prior to the year of the 
structural  break,  and  zero  otherwise.  We  also  define  an  analogous  variable  for  the  two-year  period 
preceding the structural break which we use in an alternative specification. 
 
As is evident from Table 10, we find that in each industry the coefficient on the break in the year of 
reform is larger and significantly different from the coefficient on the years preceding the reform. The 
results are somewhat weaker in the second specification for the transport reform (the last column) where 
the p-value of the test equal 0.126. Only in 3 of 10 specifications is the coefficient on the falsification 
variable positive and statistically significant.  
 
Other Robustness Checks 
 
A potential concern is that the service indices increase monotonically over time. This makes the empirical 
strategy susceptible to picking up spurious sectoral trends. If the sectors that are intensive in the more 28 
 
reformed services were more dynamic and productivity grew in these sectors for reasons unrelated to 
input improvements, we could get the results obtained so far even in the absence of a true effect of 
services liberalization on firm performance.  
 
To address this concern, we replace year fixed effects with sector-specific time trends (we use the sector 
aggregation presented in Table 2). The results, presented in Table 11, confirm our earlier findings. We 
find a positive link between the aggregate measure of services reform and the performance of downstream 
manufacturing firms. As before, larger benefits appear to accrue to foreign affiliates. A similar pattern is 
detected for the banking reform.  When it comes  to  the telecom,  insurance and transport  sectors, the 
benefits of services liberalization appear to accrue only to foreign firms. The magnitudes of the effects are 
similar to those found in Table 5 and are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
 
Finally, we examine whether our results are subject to an autocorrelation problem that could lead to the 
underestimation of standard errors, as discussed by Bertrand et al. (2004). To check for this potential 
estimation bias, we take their advice and ignore the time-series information when computing standard 
errors. We perform the test in three steps. First, we regress the logarithm of TFP on control variables 
(other  than  the  services  variables)  and  fixed  effects  and  keep  the  residuals.  Second,  we  divide  the 
residuals into two groups: residuals from the years before the structural break and residuals from the post-
break period and calculate a within-firm average for each period. In the last step, we regress the two-
period panel of mean residuals on the Breakjt variable defined in equation (5). We cluster standard errors 
for each manufacturing industry. We repeat the procedure for a break in each services sector considered in 
the analysis.  
 
As is evident from Table 12, we find positive and statistically significant (at the 1 percent level) effects 
for the banking sector, telecoms  and insurance  reform.  Somewhat  surprisingly, we obtain a negative 
coefficient for the transport reform. Given these findings, we feel reasonably confident that our baseline 








This paper suggests that previous explanations for the post-1991 growth of India‟s manufacturing sector 
have ignored an important factor: the contribution of India‟s policy reforms in services. By gathering 
detailed information on the pace of policy reform in Indian services sectors and constructing a series of 
reform indices, we demonstrate a strong and significant empirical link between progress in policy reforms 
in services sectors and productivity in manufacturing industries. Our findings are robust to a number of 
checks, including instrumenting for the pace of reform in Indian services sectors, controlling for trade 
liberalization, foreign ownership, sector-specific time trends and autocorrelation. We also investigate the 
relative contribution of reform in each of the services sectors to the productivity of manufacturing firms, 
and find that liberalization in the banking and telecommunications sectors had the most robust productivity 
effects on manufacturing firms over the period. When distinguishing the effect of services reform  by 
ownership, we find that foreign-owned subsidiaries in India display an even greater ability to reap the 
benefits of services reforms than domestic firms.  
 
The  particularly  robust  effects  of  banking  and  telecommunications  liberalization  are  intuitive  results. 
Liberalization in the banking sector has improved capital allocation and allowed investment in higher 
return projects. Liberalization of the telecommunications sector has interacted with technological change 
not only to enhance the reliability and reduce the cost of communication, but it has also paved the way for 
entirely new ways of communication and organizing production. Liberalization of the transport sector 
allows easier and less expensive transportation of raw materials and goods for export. However, reforms 
in several areas of the transportation sector in India have been slow, and some control over transport 
remains at the state level. Given that we cannot capture this state-level variation in our index, the results 
for the transportation sector seem somewhat weaker, although significant in a number of specifications. 
Insurance sector reforms do not appear to have had a strong influence in our data, possibly due to their 
limited scope so far.  
 
Services reforms in India remain incomplete and barriers to domestic and foreign competition exist in 
many other countries. This paper suggests that in addition to retarding the development of the services 
sectors, these barriers also penalize the manufacturing sector. Wider appreciation of this link may help 
create  broader  political  support  for  services  reform.  It  may  also  provide  greater  perspective  for 30 
 
international  trade  negotiations,  which  only  notionally  address  impediments  to  services  trade  and 
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Chart 1:  Growth Rates of Services Output by Level of Liberalization, 1993-2002 
 
Source:  World Bank (2004). 
 
Chart 2:  Length of Pre-Berthing Detention at Ports 
 
Source:  Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and Highways, Govt. of India, Indiastat (2008). 
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Chart 3:  Length of Turn-Around Time at Major Ports 
 
Source:  Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and Highways, Govt. of India, Indiastat (2008). 
 
Chart 4:  Phone Faults in Delhi and Mumbai per 100 Stations per month 
 




























Chart 5:  Telephone Faults across India 
 
Source:  Department of Telecommunications, Ministry of Communications, Indiastat, 2008. 
 
Chart 6:  Growth in Internet Density in India 
 




Table 1:  Summary Statistics 
      Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev. 
ln TFP Ackerberg et al.   22558  1.53  1.10 
ln Output  22558  2.57  2.01 
ln Energy   22558  -0.12  2.04 
ln Capital  22558  2.52  1.77 
ln Labor   22558  0.45  1.79 
ln Material inputs  22558  2.62  1.90 
ln Services inputs  22302  0.27  1.92 
Services Index lagged  22558  0.18  0.10 
Banking Index lagged  22558  0.06  0.07 
Rajan Zingales Banking Index lagged  22558  0.71  0.74 
Telecom Index lagged  22558  0.02  0.02 
Insurance Index  22558  0.01  0.02 
Transport Index lagged  22558  0.10  0.04 
Foreign Dummy  22558  0.18  0.38 
Tariff lagged  22558  36.47  17.17 
Input Tariff lagged  22558  16.41  9.38 
De-licensing lagged  22558  0.97  0.15 
FDI reform lagged  22558  0.87  0.33 
 
Table 2: Production function coefficients 
             
 
OLS 
     
Ackerberg et al. 
     Capital   Labor   Sum      Capital   Labor   Sum  
Food processing and tobacco products  0.155  0.682  0.837     0.166  0.829  0.995 
Textiles  0.345  0.604  0.949 
 
0.357  0.543  0.900 
Garments, leather goods and shoes  1.002  0.707  1.709 
 
0.074  0.898  0.972 
Wood products, paper products, printing and 
publishing  0.116  0.864  0.980 
 
0.302  0.780  1.081 
Coke, fuel, petroleum and chemicals  0.216  0.616  0.832 
 
0.295  0.811  1.106 
Plastic and rubber products  0.326  0.660  0.986 
 
0.261  0.778  1.039 
Concrete, cement and glass  0.139  0.735  0.874 
 
0.437  0.651  1.089 
Iron and steel  0.211  0.611  0.822 
 
0.257  0.677  0.934 
Metal products, machinery and tools  0.056  0.832  0.888 
 
0.145  0.831  0.975 
Lifting,  medical and industrial equipment  0.189  0.824  1.013 
 
0.325  0.678  1.003 
Motor vehicles and  transport systems  0.218  0.870  1.088     0.312  0.745  1.058 
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Table 3:  Productivity Effects of Services Liberalization. OLS Approach 
 
     
Services Index (t-1) 
0.875*** 
              (0.228) 
             
Banking Index (t-1)   
0.765*** 





       
(0.239) 
 
Banking Index Rajan-Zingales 
weights (t-1)     
0.164*** 
         
   
(0.033) 
         
Telecom Index (t-1)       
4.594*** 
   
4.215*** 
 
     
(1.354) 
   
(1.320) 
 










Transport Index (t-1)           
2.921*  3.282** 
 
         
(1.587)  (1.548) 
 
Tariffs (t-1) 
0.001  0.000  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
 
Input Tariffs (t-1) 
-0.002  -0.002  -0.003  0.001  -0.002  -0.004  -0.002 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
 
Foreign  
0.040**  0.041**  0.041***  0.042***  0.044***  0.046***  0.041*** 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
 
                  Observations  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558 
  R-squared  0.257  0.256  0.259  0.257  0.255  0.256  0.258 
  Number of firms  3771  3771  3771  3771  3771  3771  3771 
  Notes: The estimated specification is described in equation (4) in the text. The dependent variable is the log of real firm value 
added. Explanatory variables include capital and labor, all expressed in real terms and logs. Coefficients on production inputs are 
allowed to vary for each of 11 sectors. All specifications include firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at 
the industry-year level, are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significant at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at 
the 10 percent level 
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Table 4:  Productivity Effects of Services Liberalization. Ackerberg et al. TFP Measure 
 
     
Services Index (t-1) 
1.171*** 
              (0.227) 
             
Banking Index (t-1)   
1.046*** 





       
(0.245) 
 
Banking Index Rajan-Zingales 
weights (t-1)     
0.194*** 
         
   
(0.032) 
         
Telecom Index (t-1)       
4.765*** 
   
4.037*** 
 
     
(1.281) 
   
(1.213) 
 










Transport Index (t-1)           
3.675**  4.300** 
 
         
(1.702)  (1.660) 
 
Tariffs (t-1) 
0.001  0.000  0.003  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
 
Input Tariffs (t-1) 
-0.003  -0.003  -0.004  -0.001  -0.003  -0.007  -0.004 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
 
Foreign  
0.027  0.029*  0.030*  0.033**  0.035**  0.041**  0.032** 
  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
 
                  Observations  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558 
  R-squared  0.032  0.030  0.035  0.030  0.028  0.029  0.034 
  Number of firms  3771  3771  3771  3771  3771  3771  3771 
  Notes: The dependent variable is the log TFP estimated using the Ackerberg et al. method for each of the 11 industries listed in  
Table 2. All specifications include firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the industry-year level, are  
reported in parentheses. *** denotes significant at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level 
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Table 5:  Differential Effect of Services Liberalization on Foreign Firms. Ackerberg et al. TFP Measure 
    
Services Index (t-1) 
1.106***               
(0.236)               
Services Index (t-1)* Foreign  0.135**               
(0.063)               
Banking Index (t-1)    0.932***          0.896***   
  (0.264)          (0.263)   
Banking Index (t-1) * Foreign    0.239**          0.035   
  (0.115)          (0.124)   
Banking Index Rajan-Zingales 
weights (t-1) 
    0.182***           
    (0.034)           
Banking Index Rajan-Zingales 
weights (t-1) * Foreign 
    0.026**           
    (0.012)           
Telecom Index (t-1)         4.000***      3.454**   
      (1.391)      (1.337)   
Telecom Index (t-1) * Foreign        1.442***      1.198**   
      (0.454)      (0.554)   
Insurance Index (t-1)          0.914    0.277   
        (0.955)    (0.955)   
Insurance Index (t-1)* Foreign          2.061***    1.630***   
        (0.449)    (0.508)   
Transport Index (t-1)            3.659**  4.347***   
          (1.700)  (1.656)   
Transport Index (t-1)* Foreign            0.258*  -0.225   
          (0.135)  (0.160)   
Tariffs (t-1)  0.001  0.000  0.003  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001   
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)   
Input Tariffs (t-1)  -0.003  -0.003  -0.004  -0.001  -0.003  -0.007  -0.004   
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.007)   
Foreign   0.017  0.021  0.021  0.023  0.024  0.032**  0.021   
(0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.016)   
                 
Observations  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558   
R-squared  0.032  0.030  0.035  0.030  0.028  0.029  0.035   
Number of firms  3771  3771  3771  3771  3771  3771  3771   
Notes: The dependent variable is the log TFP estimated using the Ackerberg et al. method for each of the 11 industries listed in 
Table 2. All specifications include firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the industry-year level, are 
reported in parentheses. *** denotes significant at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level 
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Table 6:  Controlling for De-licensing and FDI Reform. Ackerberg et al. TFP Measure 
 
Services Index (t-1)  1.285***                   
 
  (0.229) 
              Banking Index (t-1) 
 
1.212*** 






       
(0.242) 
  Banking Index Rajan-
Zingales weights (t-1) 
   
0.190*** 
         
 
   
(0.031) 
          Telecom Index (t-1) 
     
5.025*** 




     
(1.328) 
   
(1.258) 
  Insurance Index (t-1) 










  Transport Index (t-1) 
         
2.986*  3.569** 
 
 
         
(1.550)  (1.466) 
  Tariffs (t-1)  -0.001  -0.001  0.001  -0.001  -0.002  -0.001  -0.000 
 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
  Input Tariffs (t-1)  -0.004  -0.004  -0.005  -0.001  -0.004  -0.007  -0.004 
 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
  De-licensing (t-1)  0.243**  0.217**  0.212*  0.231**  0.217**  0.244**  0.279** 
 
  (0.110)  (0.109)  (0.109)  (0.111)  (0.109)  (0.110)  (0.113) 
  FDI reform (t-1)  0.167***  0.173***  0.139**  0.152**  0.164**  0.112*  0.134** 
 
 
(0.064)  (0.065)  (0.064)  (0.066)  (0.065)  (0.057)  (0.057) 
  Foreign   0.030*  0.030*  0.033**  0.036**  0.037**  0.043***  0.033** 
 
  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
 
                  Observations  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558 
  R-squared  0.036  0.034  0.038  0.033  0.032  0.032  0.037 
  Number of firms  3,771  3,771  3,771  3,771  3,771  3,771  3,771 
  Notes: The dependent variable is the log TFP estimated using the Ackerberg et al. method for each of the 11 industries listed 
in Table 2. All specifications include firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the industry-year level, 
are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significant at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level 
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Table 7:  Productivity Effects of Services Liberalization. Instrumental variables approach using Ackerberg et al. TFP  
 
Second stage regressions 
               
Services Index (t-1) 
1.277*** 
              (0.260) 
             
Banking Index (t-1)   
1.061*** 





       
(0.280) 
 
Banking Index Rajan-Zingales weights (t-1)     
0.224*** 
         
   
(0.056) 
         
Telecom Index (t-1)       
5.459*** 
   
4.199*** 
 
     
(1.469) 
   
(1.507) 
 










Transport Index (t-1)           
6.891  10.174** 
 
         
(4.206)  (4.288) 
 
Tariffs (t-1) 
0.0009  0.0004  0.0030  0.0004  0.0002  0.0002  0.0019 
  (0.0018)  (0.0017)  (0.0019)  (0.0018)  (0.0018)  (0.0016)  (0.0018) 
 
Input Tariffs (t-1) 
-0.0031  -0.0035  -0.0042  -0.0001  -0.0030  -0.0094  -0.0079 
  (0.0090)  (0.0093)  (0.0089)  (0.0090)  (0.0093)  (0.0067)  (0.0059) 
 
Foreign   0.027  0.029**  0.030*  0.032*  0.034**  0.045***  0.038** 
  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.0160) 
 
                  Observations  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558 
  R-squared  0.032  0.030  0.035  0.030  0.028  0.028  0.029 
  Number of firms  3771  3771  3771  3771  3771  3771  3771 
 
                  First stage regressions 
                WTO commitments – China  2.970***  3.746***  17.665***  1.471***  2.645***  0.675*** 
   
 
(0.229)  (0.288)  (2.282)  (0.199)  (0.598)  (0.196) 
    WTO commitments – Indonesia  0.564***  0.210**  1.675  2.117***  0.398**  4.972*** 
   
 
(0.141)  (0.120)  (1.665)  (0.146)  (0.198)  (0.941) 
    Tariffs (t-1)  0.0003  -0.0001  -0.0122***  -0.0000  -0.0000  0.0001 
   
  (0.0003)  (0.0001)  (0.0018)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0001) 
    Input Tariffs (t-1)  0.0006  0.0001  0.0044  -0.0000  -0.0000  0.0004 
   
  (0.0005)  (0.0001)  (0.0074)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0003) 
    Foreign   0.003***  0.001**  -0.001  0.000  0.000*  -0.001 
   
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.009)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
    Test statistics 
                F-stat  129.470  151.650  34.440  291.620  16.590  50.410  20.690 
  p-value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  Sargan test  0.068  0.216  0.322  0.763  1.561  6.040  5.345 
  p-value  0.795  0.642  0.570  0.382  0.212  0.014  0.254 
  Notes: The dependent variable is the log TFP estimated using the Ackerberg et al. method for each of the 11 industries listed in Table 2. All 
specifications include firm fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the industry-year level, are reported in parentheses. *** denotes 
significant at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level.   
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Table 8:  Productivity Effect of Services Liberalization, Structural Break Approach. Ackerberg et al. TFP measure 
        
Banking Break 2001  2.626***          2.269***   
(0.641)          (0.549)   
Rajan-Zingales Break 2001    0.484***           
  (0.081)           
Telecom Break 2002      8.126***      6.226***   
    (2.347)      (2.223)   
Insurance Break 2002        5.218**    3.015   
      (2.227)    (1.937)   
Transport Break 1997          8.103***  8.528***   
        (2.628)  (2.633)   
Tariffs (t-1) 
0.000  0.003  0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.001   
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)   
Input Tariffs (t-1) 
-0.004  -0.004  -0.003  -0.003  -0.010  -0.009   
(0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.006)   
Foreign Dummy 
0.029*  0.030*  0.034**  0.035**  0.043***  0.034**   
(0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.016)   
               
Observations  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558   
R-squared   0.030  0.034  0.029  0.028  0.032  0.036   
Number of firms   3771  3771  3771  3771  3771  3771   
Notes: The dependent variable is the log TFP estimated using the Ackerberg et al. method for each of the 11 industries listed  
in Table 2. All specifications include firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the industry-year level,  
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Table 9:  Productivity Effect of Services Liberalization, Structural Break Approach.  
Differential Effect of Services Liberalization on Foreign Firms. Ackerberg et al. TFP Measure 
   
        
Banking Break 2001 
2.376***          2.318***   
(0.667)          (0.592)   
Banking Break 2001 *Foreign   0.649*          -0.179   
(0.384)          (0.376)   
Rajan-Zingales Break 2001    0.449***           
  (0.085)           
Rajan-Zingales Break 2001* 
Foreign  
  0.097**           
  (0.046)           
Telecom Break 2002      6.145**      4.962*   
    (2.670)      (2.626)   
Telecom Break 2002*Foreign      5.484***      3.418   
    (1.965)      (2.256)   
Insurance Break 2002        3.558*    1.934   
      (2.122)    (1.818)   
Insurance Break 2002*Foreign        4.884***    3.266**   
      (1.184)    (1.369)   
Transport Break 1997 
 
        7.983***  8.433***   
        (2.640)  (2.640)   
Transport Break 1997*Foreign          1.306***  0.989**   
        (0.481)  (0.471)   
Tariffs (t-1) 
0.000  0.003  0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.001   
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)   
Input Tariffs (t-1) 
-0.004  -0.004  -0.003  -0.003  -0.010  -0.009   
(0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.007)   
Foreign Dummy 
0.019  0.012  0.018  0.019  -0.013  -0.025   
(0.017)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.024)  (0.024)   
               
Observations  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558   
R-squared   0.030  0.034  0.030  0.029  0.032  0.037   
Number of firms   3771  3771  3771  3771  3771  3771   
Notes: The dependent variable is the log TFP estimated using the Ackerberg et al. method for each of the 11 industries listed in  
Table 2. All specifications include firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the industry-year level, are  





Table 10: Break falsification test. Ackerberg et al. TFP Measure 






















   2001  2001  2001  2001  2002  2002  2002  2002  1997  1997 
Break  2.610***  2.480***  0.528***  0.558***  9.125***  9.794***  5.198**  3.890  8.053***  7.427*** 
  (0.662)  (0.706)  (0.084)  (0.091)  (2.528)  (2.605)  (2.345)  (2.417)  (2.635)  (2.633) 
Falsification test: 1 
year prior to break 
-0.070    0.180    4.565*    -0.099    0.381   
(1.171)    (0.129)    (2.763)    (1.836)    (1.259)   
Falsification test: 2 
years prior to break 
  -0.330    0.161*    4.070    -3.378*    2.700* 
  (0.854)    (0.095)    (2.765)    (1.961)    (1.397) 
Tariffs (t-1)  0.000  0.000  0.003  0.003*  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Input Tariffs (t-1)  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.003  -0.002  -0.003  -0.003  -0.010  -0.010 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Foreign Dummy  0.029*  0.029*  0.029*  0.029*  0.033**  0.033**  0.035**  0.036**  0.043***  0.044*** 
   (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Observations  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558 
R-squared  0.030  0.030  0.035  0.035  0.030  0.030  0.028  0.028  0.032  0.033 
Break coeff =  year(s) prior coeff               
F-stat  5.21  10.74  7.2  17.09  2.91  4.39  5.02  7.57  6.59  2.36 
p-value  0.023  0.001  0.008  0.000  0.089  0.037  0.026  0.006  0.011  0.126 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log TFP estimated using the Ackerberg et al. method for each of the 11 industries listed in Table 2. All specifications include firm and year 
fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the industry-year level, are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significant at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at 
the 10 percent level. 
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Table 11:  Differential Effect of Services Liberalization on Foreign Firms. Ackerberg et al. TFP Measure.  
Adding Industry Time Trends 
    
Services Index (t-1)  0.921***               
(0.300)               
Services Index (t-1)* Foreign  0.183***               
(0.061)               
Banking Index (t-1)    0.978***          1.184***   
  (0.331)          (0.333)   
Banking Index (t-1) *Foreign    0.273**          -0.025   
  (0.109)          (0.128)   
Banking Index Rajan-Zingales 
weights (t-1) 
    0.108***           
    (0.039)           
Banking Index Rajan-Zingales 
weights (t-1) * Foreign 
    0.040***           
    (0.011)           
Telecom Index (t-1)         0.339      -1.110   
      (1.872)      (1.876)   
Telecom Index (t-1) * Foreign        1.316***      0.918*   
      (0.442)      (0.550)   
Insurance Index (t-1)          1.841    2.519   
        (1.739)    (1.958)   
Insurance Index (t-1)* Foreign          2.257***    1.909***   
        (0.492)    (0.594)   
Transport Index (t-1) 
 
          -0.119  0.295   
          (0.701)  (0.683)   
Transport Index (t-1)* Foreign            0.251*  -0.071   
          (0.143)  (0.172)   
Tariffs (t-1)  0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001  -0.000   
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)   
Input Tariffs (t-1)  0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.001  -0.001   
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)   
Foreign   0.015  0.022  0.017  0.022  0.021  0.023  0.019   
(0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.017)   
                 
Observations  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558  22,558   
R-squared  0.029  0.029  0.030  0.027  0.028  0.027  0.031   
Number of firms  3771  3771  3771  3771  3771  3771  3771   
Notes: The dependent variable is the log TFP estimated using the Ackerberg et al. method for each of the 11 industries listed in Table 2.  
All specifications include firm fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the industry-year level, are reported in parentheses. *** 
denotes significant at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level 
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Table 12:  Robustness Check on Autocorrelation. Ackerberg et al. TFP Measure 
    
Banking Break 2001  2.859***         
(0.686)         
Rajan-Zingales Break 2001    0.412***       
  (0.061)       
Telecom Break 2002      30.678***     
    (2.411)     
Insurance Break 2002        15.203***   
      (2.219)   
Transport Break 1997 
 
        -1.453*** 
        (0.512) 
           
Observations  6,142  6,142  6,059  6,059  5,440 
R-squared   0.003  0.007  0.026  0.008  0.001 
Number of firms   3771  3771  3771  3771  3771 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log TFP estimated using the Ackerberg et al. method for each 
of the 11 industries listed in Table 2. *** denotes significant at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 
percent level, * at the 10 percent level 
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[ON-LINE APPENDICES, NOT FOR PUBLICATION] 
Appendix A.  Recent History of Services Reform in India  
 
In collaboration with a team of local economists in India, we collected detailed information about policy changes 
affecting services sectors, in order to identify the key policy breaks for each sector. The local team consulted 
extensively  with  government  and  regulatory  agencies,  business  associations,  and  sector  specialists.  These 
consultations were helpful to get an understanding of the relative importance of different policy changes, and to get 
a grasp of the degree to which reforms were actually implemented at a given point in time. One of the main angles 
from which we looked at services reform was the degree to which market forces were active in the sector, triggered 
by  the  possibility  of  new  entry  into  the  sector,  both  domestic  and  foreign.  In  some  cases,  legal  or  de-facto 
restrictions on entry were reduced, leading to actual entry of new providers, and in other cases market discipline 
increased due to a potential threat of new entry.  
 
Our investigations took into account any major policy changes enacted between 1991 and 2003. In 1991, India 
embarked on a radical change of course in economic policy, involving deregulation and tariff reductions in many 
sectors. The initial reforms affected principally manufacturing sectors, while services were generally affected in the 
years following the first reforms. We record the first significant changes in financial services, telecommunications 
and transport as early as the 1993/94 fiscal year.
25 In what follows we highlight some of the major policy changes 
we recorded for 4 services sectors, and then describe our strategy for quantifying this information into a services 




Initially,  the  sole  provider  of  telecom  services in  India  was  the  Department  of Telecommunications  (DoT),  a 
government agency. Two large corporate entities were spun off from DoT in 1986, MTNL for Delhi and Mumbai, 
and VSNL for all international services.  
 
The process of entry of private players in providing telecommunication services commenced in 1992 with several 
licenses issued to the private sector, for a switching capacity of over 1.5 million lines. The first privately-owned 
lines  in  operation  were  limited  to  private  networks  in  industrial  areas,  which  emerged  during  the  fiscal  year 
1993/94.  
 
In the 1994/95 fiscal year, cellular phone service emerged in India, with initially only consumers in major cities 
being able to choose between providers. All of these have a minority participation of foreign capital, which is 
restricted to 40 percent of equity.  
 
During the same fiscal year, the government announced a new National Telecom Policy, which was the first official 
recognition  of  a  move  towards  a  privately  operated  telecommunications  sector.  The  new  policy  provided  the 
guidelines  for  further  private  sector  engagement  in  Indian  telecommunications.  For  fixed  line  services,  the 
government decided to issue one additional license to provide basic telecom services in each state, additional to the 
local public incumbent provider. The licensing process for this begins but is not concluded in this fiscal year.  
 
During 1995/96, the government attempted to auction additional licenses for both landline and cellular services, 
with some letters of intent issued to some operators for cellular operations. Rebidding had to take place for landline 
licenses in 13 states after the initial bids were considered low. Towards the end of that fiscal year, the telecom 
regulator (TRAI) was set up, to regulate further private engagement and settle disputes between operators.  
 
                                                 
25 We dated policy changes to the fiscal year rather than to the calendar year. The fiscal year in India starts on April 1
st and 
ends on March 31
st.    49 
 
In 1996/97, the government issued letters of intent for additional licenses in fixed services, and removed restrictions 
on cross-border borrowing for telecom projects. The following fiscal year saw the opening up of internet services 
for private providers, as well as the expansion of the definition of priority sector lending to include telecoms 
projects. This facilitated access to credit for telecom investments. In June 1998, the first private landline services 
became  operational.  By  1998,  there  was  an  effective  choice  of  cellular services  providers  across  most  of  the 
country.  
 
During the 1999/00 fiscal year, the government issues a new telecommunications policy, which strengthened the 
regulating agency and outlined a further opening up of national long distance to private sector as well as the 
liberalization of international calls. Moreover, the licensing fee arrangements were shifted from a fixed license fee 
to revenue sharing for existing cellular and fixed line providers which reduced financing constraints of operators. 
The Department of Telecommunications was corporatized during the 2000/01 fiscal year.  
 
During the 2002/03 fiscal year, the national long distance sector was opened to the private sector without any 
restriction on the number of operators. Despite an initial announcement of liberalizing the international segment in 
2004, the government also terminated the VSNL monopoly in international services at the beginning if the 2002/03 





Before the beginning of the reforms in the transport sector, the state played a dominant role in all segments. In air 
transport,  there  were  two  public  monopoly  carriers:  Indian  Airlines  for  domestic  routes  and  Air  India  for 
international connections. Airport infrastructure was almost entirely operated by the National Airports Authority 
and  the  International  Airports  Authority,  two  public  sector  entities.  In  maritime  transport  services,  the  state 
controlled the major ports, and shipping services were controlled by both public and domestic private enterprises. 
The latter were tightly regulated by the state, and required official permissions for acquiring and selling a vessel. In 
the road transport sector, the public sector was the only provider of road infrastructure, and only nominal tolls were 
collected  at  a  few  bridges.  Transport  operations  were  subject  to  many  rules  and  regulations  related  to  the 
registration of different types of vehicles. Preferential access to credit for small trucking companies implied that 
these accounted for about 95 percent of the sector.  
 
In 1990/91, citizens were allowed to apply for a license to operate air taxis, which was a way to circumvent to the 
domestic air transport monopoly to a limited degree. Air taxis faced a number of limitations, however. They were 
constrained to using small air craft and could not publish regular schedules. In maritime transport, regulation was 
changed in 1992/93 so as to allow foreign shipping lines to bring containers from the hinterland to a port and carry 
them to destinations abroad without trans-shipment en route. The acquisition and sale of vessels was no longer 
subject to government approval as of this fiscal year.  
 
In  1993/94,  entry  into  domestic  air  services  was  liberalized  substantially  with  the  official  abolition  of  Indian 
Airlines‟ monopoly on domestic air services. This resulted in entry into domestic air services and competitive 
pressure in the domestic market. In maritime transport, freight and passengers fares which were previously set by 
the public sector were decontrolled to promote coastal shipping. In road transport, the National Highways Act was 
amended to enable levying of a fee on selected sections of national highways. This was an important step towards 
encouraging  private  engagement  in  road  construction.  In  addition,  most  states  abolished  the  “octroi”  duty  in 
1993/94, which had previously acted as an internal tariff levied on the movement of goods across states.  
 
In 1994/95, private participation was invited into the construction of container terminals, warehousing and storage 
facilities and for repairs and transportation within ports. In road transport, an amendment was passed to remove 
ceilings on the number of stage carriage permits that can be held by an individual or a company, thus facilitating the 
emergence  of  large  trucking  companies  in  a  sector  that  was  previously  restricted  to  small  enterprises.  The 50 
 
government also created the National Highways Authority (NHAI) in order to accelerate the pace of private sector 
participation in road building. 
 
During 1995/96, operative restrictions on shipping companies were loosened. In particular, these were permitted to 
get their ships repaired at any shipyard without seeking prior approval from the government. In the following fiscal 
year, local equity requirements for companies owning a ship in India were abolished. 
 
In 1997/98, foreign direct investment (FDI) in airlines was allowed up to a 40 percent ceiling, although foreign 
airlines were still barred from investing in the Indian air transport sector. Non-resident Indians were exempted from 
the FDI ceiling. In maritime transport, FDI up to 74 percent of equity was allowed in port construction and up to 51 
percent in support activities such as pier operation. In road transport, 100 percent private engagement on a BOT 
(“Build, operate, transfer”) basis was permitted. Prior to this, the role of the private sector had been dismal, except 
as  contractors  to  the  government  entities  involved  in  infrastructure  creation.  For  up  to  74  percent  of  foreign 
participation in the construction, maintenance of roads and bridges, the investment approval was made automatic. 
In those cases where the collection of tolls was suspended due to political opposition, the government pledged to 
compensate investors according to international norms. The FDI ceiling in port construction was abolished entirely 
in 1998/99.  
 
Starting in 1999/00, foreign equity participation in air infrastructure ventures was permitted up to 74 percent with 
automatic approvals and up to 100 percent with special permissions. Restructuring of some of the airports of the 
Airport Authority of India was envisaged to take place through long term leases to the private sector. In 2004, 
private airlines were allowed to operate international routes from India. Private airline Jet Airways has already 





In the initial situation before 1993, public sector banks controlled most of the Indian market for banking services, 
coexisting with a few international banks and private banks. The expansion of foreign banks, however, was limited 
by a host of explicit and non-explicit hurdles. Branch licensing policy required any bank to obtain a license before 
it could open a branch. The Ministry of Finance was responsible for the operations of public sector commercial 
banks and the RBI regulated all banks‟ activities. Interest rates of all types were determined by the government, and 
market forces were generally not active in this sector.  
 
In the 1993/94 fiscal year, the government passed legislation to establish the in-principle approval of new private 
sector banks. The in-principle approval meant that the government was generally open to new entry with no explicit 
barriers, but potential entrants still had to go through various clearance processes. Approvals were not easy due to 
stringent RBI regulatory supervision. Equity holdings in new private banks up to 20 percent were explicitly allowed 
to “foreign institutional investors”, but foreign banks were barred from holding equity in a new private bank in 
India.  Non-resident  persons  of  Indian  origin  (termed  NRIs)  could  hold equity  of  up  to  40  percent.  As far  as 
operations are concerned, bank lending norms were liberalized and banks were given more freedom to allocate their 
inventories and receivables across different items. They were also allowed greater freedom in deploying their 
foreign exchange resources. Seven new private banks entered the market in this fiscal year.  
 
The period between 1994 and 2000 saw only minor changes to banking regulations. A first cautious attempt of 
deregulating interest rates was made in 1994/95, but this only affected very large loans and hence a few corporate 
houses able to borrow such large amounts. The active interest rates on deposits over 2 years were freed in 1996/97. 
Moreover, the ceiling for housing loans to private individuals was raised in 1998/99, and a number of items were 
added to the definition of “priority sectors”, to which 40 percent of all lending was funneled by regulation.  
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In 2000/01, the government revised norms for entry of new banks in the private sector. While the government had 
signaled its general acceptance of private entry in 1994/95, this measure reduced the implicit barriers to entry. As of 
2000, entry was made easier provided the entrant observed a continuous capital adequacy ratio of 10 percent from 
the date of start of operation and opened 25 percent of the branches in rural and semi urban areas. In addition, every 
bank was subject to allocating 40 percent of lending to priority sectors. In the same year, the government signaled 
its intention to eventually withdrawing from being a major player in the banking sector by reducing the minimum 
government equity share in nationalized banks to 33 percent and enabling the public sector banks to raise fresh 
equity from the capital. 
 
In 2001/02, the government undertook a major step towards the deregulation of interest rates. Banks were allowed 
to lend at rates below the official “Prime Lending Rate” to exporters and other credit worthy borrowers (including 
public enterprises). Banks were allowed to set their own lending rates, and to undercut them when necessary. This 
marked the emergence of price competition for loans. Private sector banks have grown significantly more important 
as lenders by this time.  
 
The restrictions to foreign engagement in the Indian banking sector were significantly reduced in 2002/03. The 
clearance process for foreign participation up to 49 percent in private banks was made automatic, rather than case-
by-case  as  before.  Beyond  this  ceiling  for  automatic  clearance,  foreigners  could  still  apply  for  case-by-case 
permission. Foreigners could also acquire capital shares up to 20 percent in public sector banks,  
 
In the Union Budget for 2003/04, the limit of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in banking companies was raised 
from 49 percent to 74 percent. Aggregate foreign investment in a private bank from all sources allowed up to a 
maximum of 74 percent of the paid up capital of the bank. A full opening of the Indian banking sector to foreign 





Reforms in the insurance sector commenced only in the second half of the 1990s. Prior to that, insurance was a 
public sector dominated sector. Life, general and medical insurance were all only conducted by four public sector 
entities under the control of the Ministry of Finance. A handful of very small domestic private sector insurers did 
exist. The level of competition was very low as each of the 4 large entities tended to specialize in one or two 
segments of the insurance market.  
 
In 1998/99, the government announced its intention to open the Indian insurance industry to the private sector, 
including joint ventures between domestic and foreign providers. This announcement was implemented with the 
Insurance Regulatory Development Authority (IRDA) Bill passed in December 1999, which explicitly opened up 
the insurance sector to private providers, allowed foreign equity in domestic insurance companies subject to a 
maximum of 26 percent of capital. Potential new entrants would have substantial freedom with respect to pricing 
and management decisions, but would be subject to regulatory supervision. However, an entry permission was still 
required, and given the dominance of the public sector enterprises, significant acquisitions were more or less ruled 
out. 
 
In 2000/01, the regulator passed 15 regulations regarding freedom of operations of private insurance companies as 
well as explicit disclosure norms. While this was important to define the rules of private entry, actual entry of 
private insurers did not take place before 2002. During the 2002/03 fiscal year, 12 new companies, among which 
life  insurance  and  general  insurance  companies,  were  granted  licenses  and  started  business.  In  2005,  the 
government announced its intention to raise the FDI limit in the insurance sector from 26 percent to 49 percent.  52 
 
Appendix B. The Construction of the Services Policy Reform Index  
 
In order to make the services policy information amenable to quantitative analysis, we translated the policy changes 
into a sector-specific reform index, taking values from 0 to 5.
26 Our primary concern was to maintain comparability 
across sectors, because our empirical strategy measures firms‟ exposure to upstream services reform by means of a 
weighted  sum  of  the  state  of  reform  in  four  services  sectors.  Common  definitions  of  what  level  of  reform 
constitutes a given value of the index were used to preserve comparability. We started out with a general template 
of degrees of openness that is not specific to any sector, and then adapted this template to the specificities of each 
of the four services sectors.  
 
In our general template, we attach an index value of 0 to a situation where hardly any progress has been made and 
the  public  sector  is  either  the  only  relevant  provider  of  services  or  has  an  extremely  strong  grip  on  private 
providers. A level of 1 indicates at least some scope for private sector participation and some liberalization of 
operational decisions, combined with some very limited scope for foreign participation (limited, for example, by 
low FDI ceilings or announced only as intentions). In order to qualify for an index value of 2, we required that there 
be  only  a  limited  degree  of  interference  with  operational  decisions  by  public  authorities,  a  substantial  price 
liberalization, and clear scope for foreign participation even if only in narrowly defined segments and as minority 
participations. Still, the state remains a dominant actor in the sector. An index of 3 implies significant scope for 
private providers, including foreign ones, a noticeable competitive pressure on the public incumbents from new 
entrants,  and  explicit  possibilities  for  foreign  equity  participation.  A  level  of  4  is  equivalent  to  little  public 
intervention into the freedom of operation of private providers, the possibility of majority foreign ownership, and 
the dominance of private sector entities. Finally, a level of 5 would be equal treatment of foreign and domestic 
providers, a full convergence of regulation with international standards and unrestricted entry into the sector.  
 
In adapting the template to sectors, one needs to take into account that in some sectors liberalization can proceed at 
different  paces  in  different  segments.  In  telecommunications,  for  example,  developing  countries  are  typically 
quicker to allow private (and foreign) capital into cellular services than into landlines. In segments where private 
entry is possible, operators tend to face relatively little public intervention in the operation of their business. As a 
result, one is likely to observe a coexistence of segments in which market forces can govern more freely with others 
that remain a public monopoly. In other sectors such as banking, there is no such natural division into segments. 
Instead, one might find a situation in which private (and foreign) entry has taken place into the provision of almost 
all banking products, but significant public interference with private decisions remains in the form of directed 
lending to priority sectors or interest rate restrictions. Hence the need to rephrase the index definitions for different 
sectors while trying to maintain the same sense of “average” openness associated to a given level of the services 
reform index. In what follows we present the sector-specific definitions of the index, and juxtapose these with the 
actual reform events that determined progress to the next level of the index. To illustrate India‟s reform progress in 
the services sectors we analyze in this paper, Figure 1 gives a graphical illustration of the variation contained in the 






                                                 
26 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development produces a similar set of indices for transition countries in their 
2004 Transition Reform, and some of the definitions used in that index have inspired the construction of our index.  53 
 






 Definition of step  Year  of  achievement  in  India,  and  accomplishments  indicating 
reform progress 
0  Clear  public  sector  dominance  with  no  private 
sector involvement 
At most announcement of future private sector role 
strong  political  interference  in  management 
decisions 
low tariffs and extensive cross-subsidies 
   
1  Some first instances of private sector involvement, 
but limited to particular segments of the market. 
Some liberalization of operational  decisions where 
private sector is involved.  
At  most  there  is  talk  about  allowing  foreign 
presence, but not yet in operation.  
1993/94  The  first  private  networks  in  industrial  areas  were 
licensed  and  put  in  operation.  Licensing  process  for 
cellular  service  begins,  envisaging  the  possibility  for 
foreign participation.  
2  Private participation begins in important segments 
of  the  market,  most  likely  the  cellular  segment 
(which  tends  to  be  the  first  to  rely  on  private 
participation).  In  these  segments,  public 
interference  with  operational  decisions  is  limited. 
There  is  clearly  defined  scope  for  foreign 
participation, but with certain limits.  
In  other  segments,  the  public  sector  remains 
dominant, with fixed-line tariffs still politically set.  
1994/95  Private cellular service providers emerge in major cities, 
all of which have some foreign equity. Process of issuing 
further licenses to private sector begins. New Telecom 
Policy  announced  to  define  framework  for  further 
private sector participation.  
FDI possible up to 49 percent.  
3  Significant  scope  for  private  providers,  including 
foreign ones, beyond one segment of the market.  
Some competitive pressure on pre-reform fixed line 
incumbent. 
Explicit  possibilities  for  foreign  equity 
participation.  
1999/00  New Telecom Policy issued which defines the way ahead 
for  a  complete  opening  of  national  and  international 
long distance market. Regulator strengthened, licensing 
fee  arrangement  made  more  favorable  for  private 
operators.  
4  Hardly  any  public  intervention  in  cellular  and 
value  added  services,  where  the  private  sector  is 
dominant  and  foreign  investors  significantly 
present. Free entry into relevant segments of the 
fixed  line  market.  Comprehensive  regulatory  and 
institutional reforms.  
2002/03  National  long  distance  market  fully  open  with  no 
restrictions  on  the  number  of  operators.  Public 
monopoly in international gateways abolished.  
5  Private  sector  providers  dominate  in  almost  all 
segments. Effective regulation through independent 
regulator  including  a  coherent  framework  to  deal 
with  interconnection  and  licensing.  Effective 
competition in most segments of the market with 
unrestricted entry.  





Definition of step  Year  of  achievement  in  India,  and  accomplishments  indicating 
reform progress 
0  Little progress, public sector is the sole provider of 
all  infrastructure,  and  has  dominant  stakes  in 
several segments of the transport sector. Where the 
public  sector  is  not  an  operator  such  as  in  road 
transport, it regulates operations heavily.  
   
1  Increased scope for private sector participation in 
some segments of the sector.  
Some liberalization of operational decisions 
Some limited scope for foreign participation in serv 
provision 
At  most  there  is  talk  about  allowing  foreign 
presence, but not yet in operation. 
1993/94  Abolition  of  the  formal  monopoly  in  domestic  air 
services, entry into domestic air services. Liberalization 
of  prices  in  maritime  freight  and  passenger  transport. 
Explicit recognition of the possibility to levy user fees 
on  national  highways,  which  was  considered  a 
precondition for private engagement.  
2  Private participation begins in important segments 
of  the  market.  In  these  segments,  public 
interference  with  operational  decisions  is  limited. 
There  is  clearly  defined  scope  for  foreign 
participation,  but  with  certain  limits.  In  other 
segments, the state remains the dominant actor.  
1997/98  FDI  in  air  transport  up  to  40  percent  is  allowed 
(although foreign airlines are excluded). Majority FDI 
possible in the construction and operation of ports. First 
private sector engagement in road infrastructure under 
the “Build, Operate, Transfer” scheme.  
3  Significant  scope  for  private  providers,  including 
foreign ones, beyond one segment of the market.  
Some  competitive  pressure  on  public  sector 
operators. 
Explicit  possibilities  for  foreign  equity 
participation.  
2004/05  Private airlines permitted to serve international routes. 
Both  public  sector  airlines  feel  significant  competitive 
pressure from private competitors.  
4  Important  segments  are  almost  free  of  public 
intervention,  with  private  sector  operators  being 
dominant  and  significant  foreign  engagement 
present. Free entry into relevant segments of the 
transport market.  
-   
5  Private  sector  providers  dominate  in  almost  all 
segments. Effective competition in most segments 
of  the  market  with  unrestricted  entry.  Equal 
treatment of foreign and domestic providers. 









Definition of step  Year  of  achievement  in  India,  and  accomplishments  indicating 
reform progress 
0  Little  progress,  public  sector  plays  the  dominant 
role.  Where  there  are  private  operators,  their 
operations and scope of services on offer are tightly 
regulated.  
   
1  Increased scope for private sector participation.  
Some  liberalization  of  operational  decisions,  but 
directed  lending  remains  prevalent.  Some  limited 
scope for foreign participation in domestic banks.  
1993/94  Legislation  passed  to  signal  government’s  in-principle 
approval  of  new  private  entry  into  banking  sector.  7 
new banks enter the market. FDI up to 20 percent but 
foreign banks are barred. Banks given more freedom to 
allocate their inventories and receivables across different 
items.  
2  Significant private participation becomes possible. 
Public interference with operational decisions and 
discretionary barriers to entry are limited. There is 
clearly defined scope for foreign participation, but 
with certain limits. The state remains a dominant 
actor.  
2000/01  Discretionary barriers to entry into banking sector are 
lowered  significantly.  State  signals  its  intent  to 
eventually withdraw from the banking sector.  
3  Significant  scope  for  private  banks,  including 
explicit  possibilities  for  foreign  equity 
participation. Some competitive pressure on public 
sector operators. 
2001/02  Major  interest  rate  deregulation  allows  banks  to  set 
prices  more  freely.  Private  sector  banks  gain  more 
relevance  as  lenders  and  begin  to  crowd  out  public 
sector banks in some instances.  
4  Important  segments  are  almost  free  of  public 
intervention,  with  private  sector  operators  being 
dominant  and  significant  foreign  engagement 
present. Free entry into relevant segments of the 
transport  market.  Majority  foreign  ownership  is 
possible.  
2002/03  Foreign  participation  in  Indian  banks  is  made 
significantly  easier.  Clearance  for  up  to  49  percent  of 
equity is automatic, and majority ownership is possible 
subject to case-wise approval.  
5  Private  sector  providers  dominate  in  almost  all 
segments. Effective competition in most segments 
of  the  market  with  unrestricted  entry.  Equal 
treatment of foreign and domestic providers. Full 
convergence  of  regulation  with  international 
standards.  





Definition of step  Year  of  achievement  in  India,  and  accomplishments  indicating 
reform progress 
0  Little  progress,  public  sector  plays  the  dominant 
role. 
   
1  Increased scope for private sector participation.  
Some  liberalization  of  operational  decisions,  but 
still massive intervention. Some limited scope for 
foreign participation but low FDI ceilings.  
1999/00  Bill passed to open up the insurance sector to private 
entry,  including  foreign  equity  participation  up  to  26 
percent. Substantial freedom with respect to pricing, but 
strict  regulatory  supervision.  Discretionary  entry 
permission  was  required,  and  no  acquisitions  possible 
due to public sector dominance.  
2  Significant private participation becomes possible. 
Public interference with operational decisions and 
discretionary barriers to entry are limited. There is 
clearly defined scope for foreign participation, but 
with certain limits. The state remains a dominant 
actor.  
 
-   
3  Significant  scope  for  private  banks,  including 
explicit  possibilities  for  foreign  equity 
participation. Some competitive pressure on public 
sector operators. 
2002/03  Entry of 12 new private providers of insurance services, 
which  constitutes  a  massive  shake-up  of  the  market. 
Competitive pressure on incumbent public insurers. FDI 
ceiling remains at 26 percent.  
4  Most operational decisions are almost free of public 
intervention,  with  private  sector  operators  being 
dominant  and  significant  foreign  engagement 
present. Free entry into relevant segments of the 
market. Majority foreign ownership is possible.  
-   
5  Private  sector  providers  dominate.  Effective 
competition in most segments of the market with 
unrestricted entry. Equal treatment of foreign and 
domestic  providers.  Wide  array  of  insurance 
services  available  at  competitive  prices.  Full 
convergence  of  regulation  with  international 
standards.  
-   
 